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POLITICS 
 
 
 
This paper provides an overview of dif-
ferent approaches to forecasting the future 
of the three Baltic States. The author’s 
theoretical approach to studying Baltic 
elites is used to forecast changes in the ac-
tion models of the Baltic elites. The article 
stresses the scarcity of internal political 
processes in the Baltics. However, a signifi-
cant number of scenarios focusing on mili-
tary aspects in the Baltics have recently 
been published. The author distinguishes 
between inertia, confrontation, and coop-
eration scenarios and examines their pre-
requisites and possible consequences. The 
scenarios are developed based on an ana-
lysis of geographic, economic, and political 
factors. The decisive factor is a state-cont-
rolled foreign policy, which is affected by 
the international situation as well as rela-
tions between the state and the external 
resources exploited by political elites. The 
paper contributes to the general debate 
about the factors of political development 
and the role of political elites in it. The au-
thor provides additional material for ana-
lysing possible developments in the do-
mestic policies of the Baltic States in view 
of external factors. 
 
Key words: political elite, Baltic States, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, forecast, scena-
rio approach 
 
Forecasts for the Baltics 
 
Most forecasts consider the Baltics 
as part of the Baltic Sea region, which 
comprises states bordering on the Baltic 
Sea. Forecasts for the development of 
the Baltics can be divided into three 
major groups — general forecasts, se-
curity forecasts, and political forecast. 
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General forecasts are based on the analysis of the regional economic, 
demographic, environmental, migration, and other trends and their influence 
on the future of the Baltics. The report ‘The Role of Regional Collaboration 
in the Baltic Sea Region of the Future’ [13] considers trends towards a re-
duction in the relative influence of the Baltic region at the level of world 
economy, as compared to the regions of South and East Asia [5]. The key 
variables used in these scenarios are trade liberalisation or protectionism 
within the EU countries of the Baltic region and between Russia and the EU. 
In the optimistic scenario, the opening markets and developing transport in-
frastructure contribute to regional integration. The baseline scenario suggests 
the continuation of the regional dialogue on economic and political issues 
without further integration. In the negative scenario, states of the region re-
sort to protectionist measures. 
A number of forecasts focus on the demographic situation in the region. 
The analytical report ‘The Future of the Baltic Sea Region: Potentials and 
Challenges’ [23] published by Hamburg Institute of International Economics 
states that, in 2010—2030, the demographic decline will reach 4.9 % in Es-
tonia, 7.6 % in Lithuania, and 9.6 % in Latvia. Moreover, during this period, 
the number of working age population (15—44 years of age) will decrease 
by 17.9 % in Estonia, 23.2 % in Lithuania, and 24.3 % in Latvia. A recent 
forecast published by the European Commission suggests that by 2060, the 
size of Latvia’s population will have dwindled from 2 to 1.4 million, the 
population of Lithuania — from 3 to 1.8 million, and that of Estonia — from 
1.3 to 1.1 million [25]. 
The report ‘TransBaltic Forecasts and Scenarios for BSR Corridor Flows 
2030’ analyses the impact of transport corridors on the future of the Baltic 
Sea region and the Baltics. The document estimates possible economic ef-
fects of three scenarios for the countries of the region: a) establishing the 
West — East corridor, b) development of the Northern Sea Route, c) devel-
opment of a green corridor network in the EU. The major parameter of all 
scenarios is the scenario timeline. It is expected that the North Sea Route 
will remain ice-free during 4—5 months at the end of the 21st centuries. To-
day this period is 45 days. 
Environmental forecasts for the Baltic Sea region were a common occur-
rence in 1990—2000. For instance, the Swedish Environmental Protection 
Agency published a voluminous document [26] providing a detailed analysis 
of trends, scenarios, and threats to the environment of the Baltic Sea in the 
context of preserving biodiversity and prevention of environmental risks as-
sociated with wartime ammunition buried on the Baltic Sea floor. 
Military and security forecasts are usually more detailed; they focus 
primarily on the Baltics. Most forecasts are based on the assumption that se-
curity of the Baltics will be determined by the dynamics of the US-EU-
Russia relations [28]. The EU is often viewed as an economic and political 
alliance without strong international influence on security. The major role is 
played by NATO, which comprises most of the EU states. This assumption 
is used by the analysts of the Swedish Ministry of Defence, which published 
a large security forecast for the Baltic Sea region [11]. 
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During the last two years, military exercises based on scenarios of possi-
ble conflicts with Russia have become popular in the West. The Baltics are 
considered as the most probable scene of military action. For instance, the 
RAND corporation published a report [19] examining different scenarios of 
Russian ‘invasion’ into the Baltics. It is concluded that it would take the 
Russian army approximately 60 hours to reach the three Baltic capitals. 
Boosting NATO presence in the Baltics is suggested as a ‘preventive’ meas-
ure. Similar conclusions are made by the authors of the forecast ‘Alliance at 
Risk’ prepared by the NATO-financed Atlantic Council [9]. It uses stronger 
wording and states that the Russian-speaking Baltic minorities would be-
come the centre of a Russia-NATO confrontation. 
Hypothetical mass rallies of Russian-speaking minorities or an uprising 
in the Latgale region of Latvia are considered as an immediate cause of a 
conflict between Russia and NATO [16]. Another scenario suggests that 
Russia and NATO’s military exercises will result in unintended escalation, 
which may lead to a conflict in the conditions of increased tension [10]. 
Lithuania may block transit to the Kaliningrad region and catalyse this con-
flict. Western experts consider this scenario as the most dangerous one for 
the region. 
Political forecasts attract less interest than general or military ones. One 
of such forecasts was prepared by the National Research Institute of World 
Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 
2015 [3]. The forecast shows that if the international crisis de-escalates in 
Eastern Europe, pragmatic interests of Baltic corporations will have a more 
profound effect on politics, softening the rhetoric of Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia’s political leadership. 
An important comprehensive forecast of international political situation 
in the Baltics was prepared by the Finnish scholar Arno Tanner 20 years ago 
[24]. The optimistic scenario was associated with stabilisation in Russia, the 
development of the Western European Union (WEU), and a gradual devel-
opment of the EU-Russia relations. One of the expected results was stabilisa-
tion in Europe accompanied by the decreasing influence of NATO and the 
EU. The baseline scenario suggested the failure of the WEU project, stabili-
sation of Russia as a democratic state, and OSCE becoming a guarantor of 
security in the Baltic Sea region. The pessimistic confrontation scenario sup-
posed that Poland and Baltics’ accession to NATO would put distance be-
tween Russia and Europe and weaken the WEU in comparison to NATO. As 
a result, preconditions for a new cold war would arise in the region. Without 
a buffer between Russian and NATO, this would increase the risks. 
The current international crisis in Eastern Europe centring on Ukraine 
has given an impetus to scenarios based on Samuel Huntington’s concept of 
‘a clash of civilisations’. One of the works by the Romanian political scien-
tist Alina Mungiu-Pippidi has made an important contribution to these sce-
narios [14]. The author forecasts a civilizational divide between Europe and 
non-Europe along the Dniester. The Western world would comprise today’s 
NATO member states, whereas non-NATO countries would not be part of 
political Europe. 
There are few forecasts for the Baltics focusing on domestic political 
trends, which are affected by the regional and international situation. This 
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article aims to contribute to closing this gap. After the Baltics had seceded 
from the USSR, the countries’ political elites opted for a conflict model in 
the eastern policy. Forecasting possible changes in the selected model1 is an 
interesting area of research. It allows for analysing the causes and drivers 
behind policies of the Baltic leadership. It can serve as a basis for formula-
ting scientifically justified scenarios of the future political development and 
alignment of the Baltics in the international arena. 
However, forecasting current political changes in the Baltics is restricted 
to short-term estimates, relying on the minute balance of powers and inter-
ests rather than on theoretical models. There are few works on this topic, 
which is new for Russian researchers. Within the Russian tradition, more 
attention is paid to changes in the personal composition of political leader-
ship. In the Baltics, they do not always entail serious alterations in the states’ 
policies. This makes a scenario analysis a relevant area of research, since it 
considers situations that can affect the performance model of the Baltic elites 
and transform the attitudes of the Baltics towards their neighbours. 
Forecasting political processes usually includes the several steps: develo-
ping a theoretical model of the object under consideration; based on the 
theoretical model, identifying key factors and variables affecting the object, 
and constructing scenarios reproducing probable states and actions of the 
object. It is important to be aware of an inevitable dichotomy. When restric-
ting a forecast to the logical development of a theoretical model, one be-
comes hostage to the deterministic approaches that simplify complicated po-
litical dynamics. In other words, a simple extrapolation of key factors theo-
retically affecting the conditions of the object into the future yields mecha-
nistic forecasts that do not provide the desired result for either scientific 
analysis, or political decision-making. 
The other extreme is prognostic attempts based on arbitrary and non-
formalised selection of factors and their effect on the studied object. A good 
research strategy is combining the two approaches. Any forecast should be 
based on a clear theoretical model, but researchers enjoy relevant freedom in 
determining the values of variables and constructing different scenarios. 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
In this article, the forecast is based on the theoretical model2 proposed by 
the author, which defines political elites as social groups comprising a politi-
cal body that can exert control over the state using formal and informal 
means. This body analyses the interests, resources, and goals of the state, 
which allows for developing a modus operandi manifested in decision-ma-
                                                     
1 The action model is the consistent behaviour of political elite in foreign politics. 
The model can be described in foreign policy doctrines, which transform it into a stra-
tegy as a package of coordinated actions to reach a long-term goal. However, the ac-
tual performance of a state in the international arena can differ substantially from the 
declared principles due to poor recognition or conscious camouflaging of interests. 
2 The theoretical framework of the proposed model is as follows: structural approaches 
developed within elite studies, neo-institutional approaches (the state is a bureaucratic 
organisation with formal and informal rules), and international relations theory.  
Politics  
 88
king at the government level. Internal organisations and the degree of poly-
centricity of political elites can differ. Political crises are associated with 
rifts and internal conflicts within power groups. 
A political elite acts in a certain domestic (interactions with social groups 
and organisations) and foreign (interactions with other states and internatio-
nal subjects) political environment. 
The actions of a country’s leadership are aimed at managing resources, 
raising prestige [22], and securing and extending power. Promotion of these 
interests depends on available resources and the sturdiness of the intra-elite 
coalition supporting the single authority principle in strategic areas of gov-
ernance. Stability and efficiency of political elites depends on the stability of 
public institutions. In these cases, the institutional (organisational) resource 
is supplemented by material and moral/psychological resources available to 
the ruling circles. When resources are no longer sufficient for ensuring 
budget stability, intra-elite conflicts arise. However, this process can be stal-
led by an external threat. 
Geographically determined resource endowment — size of the territory, 
demographic and natural resources — is affected by the nature of the ties 
between the ruling circles and the domestic and foreign political environ-
ment (economic and military/political factors). The classical formula sug-
gests that ‘power and responsibility for the lives of nations are not ab-
stractions… One begins quite naturally with the nature of a nation’s resour-
ces, which are not confined to factories or armies or bombs, but extend also 
to culture, political ideas, and education’ [6, р. 15—16]. 
Interactions with foreign political environment depend on this combina-
tion of potentials. To a degree, they are determined by the position of a state 
in the international system — its role in the global system of the division of 
labour and political standing in relation to other subjects of international re-
lations, primarily, world powers and ‘empires’3. The scope of available ‘ni-
ches’ in international politics is limited by a state’s geographical position, 
territory, and economic and military potential, which determines opportuni-
ties for and forms of interaction with ‘empires’, creating a major economic, 
military, and political configuration of international relations. The largest 
states and ‘empires’ can act as subjects in world politics, whereas the role of 
an agent is reserved for smaller states that have to fit into the interests and 
interactions of ‘empires’. In the periods of stable functioning of ‘empires’, 
smaller and medium states have almost no freedom in choosing their ‘niche’. 
Potential ‘niches’ can be classed according to their functions (performed for 
the benefit of ‘empires’) in the system of international relations, i. e. in trade, 
defence, and ideology. These functions create the following niches: 
— in trade: a ‘transit country’ or an ‘economic bridge’; the elite plays 
the role of a mediator; 
                                                     
3 Joseph Colomer considers ‘empires’ to be key subjects in international relations, 
even at the current stage. He defines an ‘empire’ as a polity without fixed or perma-
nent boundaries and characterised by multilevel, often overlapping jurisdictions. For 
more detail, see [8]. 
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— in defence: a ‘buffer’ or an ‘outpost’ at the border of an ‘empire’; the 
elite plays the role of a gatekeeper; 
— In ideology: a ‘cause promoter’ or an ‘expert’ on the neighbouring 
countries within ‘zones of interests’ of an ‘empire’; the elite plays the role of 
a ‘missionary’. 
The study of the Baltic elites shows that the ‘gatekeeper’ and ‘mission-
ary’ roles, which they play in the North Atlantic Alliance, contradict the role 
of a ‘mediator’. These roles and functions determined by the selected ‘niche’ 
are translated into persistent series of political steps and reactions from the 
elite, leading to the conservation of certain action models. One can say that 
the role of a ‘mediator’, which was played by the Baltics until the beginning 
of the century, has been lost for good [1]. 
This theoretical model can be used as a framework for forecasting future 
actions of political elites of smaller countries based on the identification of 
the available niches (roles) and conditions for selecting them. It is important 
to remember that the selection of a ‘niche’ determines, to a great degree, 
both the political development of smaller states and possible changes in the 
action model of their elite in the future. 
In political science, the theoretical model of an object is not considered 
complete or exhaustive. Political processes can be interpreted as a result of 
an intricate intertwining of numerous cause-effect relations, some of which 
elude scientific analysis due to their non-public nature and their non-mani-
festation until a certain moment. The uncertainty of political process is in-
creased by the so-called ‘human’ factor, which takes on special importance 
during political crises, when decisions of political elites determine long-term 
trajectories of institutional development [18]. 
It is important to describe the above mentioned theoretical approaches in 
more detail, i. e. formulating and verifying relevant forecasts. The scope of 
alternative scenarios of the modelled object gives a better understanding of the 
logic behind its development and allows for the identification of strengths and 
weaknesses of the theory. 
The most frequently used approaches to constructing scenarios are the 
search and normative ones. The former aims to analyse and extrapolate cur-
rent trends into the future; the latter is meant to describe ‘target futures’ of 
the object and identify possible factors and events leading to such states. 
Firstly, the theoretical approach to studying political elites, which is adopted 
in this article, requires an assessment of qualitative changes in the elite’s ac-
tion model. This means a careful reconsideration of interactions between the 
political elite and the domestic and international political environment. In the 
case of the Baltic elites — the leadership of smaller states — changes in the 
external political environment and its structural characteristics is a key factor 
behind the emergence of a new action model. Such changes transform the 
configuration of the ‘niches’ and roles assumed by the ruling circles. 
At the same time, scientifically justified normative scenarios are always 
based on the search approach aimed at identifying current trends and analys-
ing the ‘reference point’ in the development of new states described in nor-
Politics  
 90
mative scenarios. In the normative context, confrontation and cooperation 
are radically new states; it reflect the general nature of relations between the 
object and its environment [4]. 
Thus, there are three basic scenarios: a) the baseline scenario (an assess-
ment of current trends), b) a confrontation scenario, c) a cooperation scenario. 
 
Factors behind the actions of the Baltic political elites 
 
The key factors affecting the object of research and its further develop-
ment can be deduced from the theoretical model. These factors are divided 
into relatively certain (corroborated by scientific theories and historical 
facts) and relatively uncertain (results of an arbitrary combination of differ-
ent circumstances), which modern theories cannot predict with a high prob-
ability. This explains the relevance of employing the scenario approach in 
forecasting the development of the studied object. 
The key factors used for forecasting changes in the action model of the 
Baltic political elites can be divided into geographical, economic, and politi-
cal ones. These groups of factors do not have a linear connection. However, 
they reflect a transition from more certain geographic factors to less certain 
political ones. ‘In between’, there are economic factors; they are affected by 
both geography and politics and, at the same time, they influence political 
processes. 
The geographic factors include a country’s geographic position, the cli-
mate, landscape, and natural resources. These are the most basic and certain 
factors that can serve as independent variables determining the historical and 
cultural logic of a state’s development and the scope of possible actions of 
its political elites. The group of economic factors includes demographic and 
technological characteristics of a state, its industrial and transport potential, 
energy, industry, and external economic ties. 
The political factors embrace the system of resource management and 
distribution at the national and supranational level as well as interactions be-
tween political elites and other states and international subjects, which affect 
the resource and defence potential and the development of social and eco-
nomic institutions on this territory. The scenario approach allows for analys-
ing mutual influence of these factors and their future configurations. 
Let us provide an overview of each group of factors using the Baltics as 
an example. Geographically, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are situated 
along the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea; they have strong historical connec-
tions with the Baltic region and Polesia. Culturally and historically, the Bal-
tics gravitated towards Eastern Europe — Germany, Poland, and Russia. In 
this case, we can use the term ‘Central Europe’, which was used by imperial 
Berlin and Vienna to refer to the territory between France and Russia. Al-
though Estonia’s self-positioning as part of Nordic Europe seems to be inap-
propriate. One should admit that the Baltics were historically situated at the 
intersection of interests of Eastern and Western empires. It explains frequent 
changes in boundaries, zones of influences, and foreign policy objectives of 
the countries’ local elites. 
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Most European geographers and specialists in regional studies class 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as buffer territories sandwiched between Rus-
sia and Germany — the largest EU economy and the political leader in the 
East. This approach is dominated by an objective interpretation of the geo-
graphic or, more precisely, geoeconomic and geopolitical position rather 
than political assessments. The control of data on ‘in-between’ regions 
(‘double periphery’) makes it possible to affect the degree of amity between 
Russia and Germany and, therefore, the EU. Over a long period, the ‘island 
empires’ — Great Britain and, later, the US — have shown increased inter-
est in these territories. 
The geographical position of the Baltics is very important for defence, 
since these NATO members serve as a barrier to the expansion of Russia’s 
influence in the Baltic Sea region and as a flank that can potentially threaten 
Russia’s North-West. The military significance of the Baltics is determined 
not only by the proximity to the political centres of Russia, but also the op-
portunity to exert influence over the Baltic Sea basin and the space between 
the Baltic and Black Seas through affecting the situation in Belarus and Uk-
raine from the North. 
In terms of economics, the Baltics are characterised by meagre and de-
clining demographic resources, ageing population, and unceasing outflow of 
working-age citizens, which impedes prospective economic growth [27]. 
Large port facilities and a developed railway network of the Baltics create a 
significant potential for cargo transit along the West-East and North-South 
corridors, which has not been fully developed due to political tensions. The 
transport and energy systems of the Baltics are interconnected with those of 
Russia and Belarus. Russia still accounts for over 90 % of the Baltics’ im-
ports of oil and natural gas [12]. However, the Klaipeda port boasts an LNG 
terminal receiving gas from Norway and other countries. 
The Baltics’ economies are dominated by the service sector and they are 
open to the West, which makes the countries very sensitive to economic cri-
ses. This became evident in 2008—2009. Firstly, the gradual loss of most of 
industrial potential after the secession from the USSR and, secondly, the 
Nordic countries gaining control over the countries’ banking sector deprive 
the Baltic elites of the freedom to take independent steps in politics and 
economy. A relatively small scale of economic activities does not make it 
possible for national governments to carry out large infrastructure projects, 
which have become heavily dependent on EU funds [1]. 
The political factors affecting the development of Baltic elites are deter-
mined primarily by the small sizes of the Baltic States. To ensure security 
and economic development, smaller states have to accede to large intergov-
ernmental alliances (‘empires’). After the demise of the USSR, the Baltic 
elites were consistently pursuing the ‘return to the West’ policy, which en-
joyed broad support in the countries. As a result, the three states acceded to 
the EU and NATO in 2004. However, the ‘return’ process did not end but 
rather assumed a new form. Adapting to the common EU market has had a 
profound effect on the structure of the Baltics’ economies, increasing the 
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proportion of the services sector and encouraging labour emigration. NATO 
membership imposes restriction on the freedom of political choice — the 
Baltic elites have to abide by the military and political imperatives of the 
bloc. The Baltics are perceived as ‘front-line states’ [15], this concept being 
very popular in the US. 
Within the Euro-Atlantic community, political elites of the Baltics are 
provided with both military guarantees and economic support — opportuni-
ties to boost their status and their legitimacy at home. Having the power of 
veto in the EU, the elites of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia can draw atten-
tion in the European political processes. However, their dependence on 
European investment in infrastructure projects, career ambitions of politi-
cians within the EU and NATO structures, and NATO’s bloc discipline 
make the power of veto next to meaningless when it comes to major Euro-
pean issues. Nevertheless, this does not hold true for relations with Russia. 
For instance, Lithuania vetoed the signing of a new Partnership and Coop-
eration Agreement between Russia and the EU in 2008. The very existence 
of this power makes the domestic policy of the Baltics an important issue for 
the Euro-Atlantic bloc and Washington, the latter trying to prevent the emer-
gence of ‘weak links’ in the enlarged NATO. This explains the plans to inte-
grate the transport4 and energy systems of the Baltics into the European space, 
a discrimination policy towards national minorities, and the West ignoring the 
problems of alien population in Latvia and Estonia5. However, due to their 
periphery geographical position and a low trade and economic status, the Bal-
tics are not critically important partners for the US. This leads to an unceasing 
struggle of the Baltic elites for increasing their significance and attracting at-
tention of the ‘empire’ through scaremongering, preaching about the ‘threat 
from the East’, and taking part in almost all NATO operations. 
 
Scenario forecast 
 
The analysis of the key factors shows that there are highly probable (cer-
tain) trends that determine the scope of actions of the Baltics’ political elites 
and less certain trends that outline the variants of future development. The 
                                                     
4 In a number of analytical publications, Western experts emphasise the link between 
the construction of Rail Baltica, which will have the standard European gauge and 
connect the Baltics with Poland and Germany, and the military needs of NATO. 
‘A better rail connection with Europe would enable NATO forces to react more 
quickly to crises, especially in terms of moving high volumes of armoured vehicles 
in the event of an emergency’, Eugene Chusovsky writes [17].  
5 Western experts linked ‘military threats’ from Russia to the problems of energy 
independence and the accelerated integration of the Baltics into the energy system of 
the Nordic states, which is an apparent contradiction (see, for instance [20, p. 125]. 
US researchers consider the military security of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the 
context of developing LNG supply, stressing that energy supply ‘has an impact on 
military readiness’ [7, р. 11].  
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Baltic States are smaller countries, thus the action model of their elites will 
largely depend on their ‘niche’ in international politics. The position on the 
eastern shore of the Baltic Sea can contribute to the trade, economic, and 
cultural gravitation of the Baltics towards the Nordic states and Germany. 
The interconnection of the transport and energy infrastructure of the Baltics 
with Russia and imports of oil and gas from Russia makes the stability of 
these states sensitive to relations between Russia and the North Atlantic Al-
liance. Russia is forced to find corridors in the Baltic Sea bypassing the Bal-
tics, which diminishes the significance of the Baltics in Russia’s domestic po-
licy. However, the NATO membership contributes to the barrier function of the 
Baltics’ borders. For the military alliance, the border states perform the impor-
tant function of sustaining the stability and security of demarcation lines. 
From the perspective of geography and history, the Baltics are located at 
the intersection of the ‘great European peninsula’ and continental Eurasia. 
Therefore, their development will range between the extremes of a ‘bridge’ 
and a ‘barrier’ and will depend on the general political and economic situa-
tion in Europe. More particularly, it will be affected by the formation of a 
common security space or the persistence of demarcation lines at NATO’s 
eastern borders, the creation of trans-continental trade corridors or increasing 
protectionism between the EU and the EAEU, etc. There are variants to 
these development paths and their analysis requires a scenario forecast. It is 
important to consider the transformation of the structure of international 
politics, which will change the alignments of the Baltics’ ruling elite and, 
therefore, their personal composition. 
 
Baseline scenario 
 
The baseline scenario suggests extrapolating the main trends affecting 
the current action model of the Baltic elites into the future. The key assump-
tions are the persistence of military and political characteristics of NATO 
and close interactions between the EU military command and the North At-
lantic Alliance with a dominating role of Washington. Maintaining the status 
quo will force NATO to seek further enlargement: if NATO expansion stops, 
the bloc discipline will weaken, which can contribute to the centrifugal 
trends produced by the deep internal crisis in the EU. As the ‘neutral’ geo-
graphical space in Eastern Europe shrinks, Russia-NATO relations will be-
come more strained. The unilateral efforts to ‘switch’ the Baltic infrastruc-
ture to the Western mode at the expense of severing connection with Russia 
will continue. Russian export to Europe via the Baltics will decrease. 
In this situation, even an apparent shortage of resources will not lead to a 
change in the policies of the Baltic elites. Confrontation prevents from the 
development of an alternative ‘niche’, which could make it possible for the 
Baltic politicians to assume the role of a ‘mediator’ and a ‘trade bridge’ be-
tween the West and the East. 
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The efforts towards economic pragmatism will be interpreted as potential 
political and military threats, which will contribute to the polycentricity of 
the Baltic elites. Amid confrontation, this can be interpreted as a risk of the 
weakening of NATO at the ‘front line’. This can decrease the competitive-
ness of the Baltics’ economies and increase their vulnerability (Russian ex-
perts stressed it even before the 2008—2009 crisis [2]). The growing conflict 
potential will adversely affect external trade in the Baltics. 
At the level of doctrines, the Baltics will consider Russia and the EAEU 
as competitors and an insidious threat. At the level of political rhetoric, 
propaganda will become more active. The ‘threat from the East’ will be in-
voked to explain economic instability. The Baltics’ political elites will be 
forced to play on the contradiction between larger states (primarily, the US, 
Germany, Russia) and promote an image of the most active, decisive, and 
vulnerable members of NATO to attract additional resource and attention. 
The conflict action model can deprive the Baltic societies of the benefits 
associated with transit and multilateral economic cooperation and decrease 
the general competiveness of their national economies. An interconnection 
with the Western transport and energy system will increase the production 
costs for local manufacturers. Since the Baltics lie beyond the zone of the 
vital interests of the US and Russia, the risk of a military confrontation will 
remain moderately low (although alarmist forecasts from Western politi-
cians, experts, and mass media are frequent and abundant6). The Baltics elite 
will not have sufficient resources for changing the ‘rules of the game’. The 
actions of the Baltics’ political leadership will be determined by the positive 
motivation of attracting additional resources within the Euro-Atlantic com-
munity to strengthen the ‘strategic security’ and boost personal careers in the 
EU. The negative motivation will be the fear of losing the trust of the North 
Atlantic Alliance and the US due to an insufficiently stringent position on 
the key issues of the Alliance’s policy. 
 
Confrontation scenario 
 
The second scenario is confrontation. The key assumption is that the 
situation developing in accordance with the above scenario will be supple-
mented by the system crisis in the EU. The latter can combine a socioeco-
nomic crisis and possible collapse of the Eurozone aggravated by the migra-
tion crisis, which will have a devastating effect on the economies of the Baltic 
States. This will result in an acute deficit of resources to sustain the stability of 
state institutions and prevent an intra-elite rift in Lithuania, Latvia, and Esto-
nia. The largest states of the EU will allocate resources to stabilise their major 
sales markets and support socio-political stability on their territories. 
The most precarious situation is associated with an internal crisis in the 
Baltics accompanied by increasing international confrontation. In these con-
ditions, an acute internal crisis can lead to the Baltic elites taking ill-
                                                     
6 One of the recent examples is a forecast based on game theory principle, which 
shows that the Estonia crisis can lead to World War III (for more detail, see [10]). 
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considered drastic steps provoking an international rather than local crisis7. 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will be forced to cut social expenditure, which 
will increase the risk of the emergence of powerful political opposition. In 
this situation, political provocations can serve as a pretext to attract attention 
and financial support to the Baltics from the largest EU states. If these steps 
do not yield the expected result, the Baltics can opt for attracting the atten-
tion of NATO through blowing the national minority situation out of propor-
tion8 and placing a transport blockade on the Kaliningrad region9. This will 
lead to the complete severance of all economic ties with Russia, including 
transit, and aggravate the political and military situation in the region. 
 
Cooperation scenario 
 
The cooperation scenario is based on the assumption that the Baltics will 
abandon the buffer/front-line ‘niche’ at the borders of the North Atlantic Al-
liance for the role of a neutral ‘mediator’. Today, the role of a mediator is 
out of reach of the Baltic elites, since it does not exist in the international 
political environment. A transition to a neutral state is almost excluded from 
the current international configuration, since NATO continues to develop 
within the bloc logic and the border of the military alliance performs a pri-
marily barrier function hampering the development of active transboundary 
cooperation. 
A key prerequisite for the cooperation scenario is a change in the system 
of common security in Europe through developing interactions with Russia, 
the Eurasian Economic Union and reforming NATO towards more flexible 
and open organisation. that would ensure achieving the goals of creating a 
common space of indivisible security in Europe. These trends will open the 
way for developing security cooperation between the EU and Russia and en-
courage the Baltic elites — and the leadership of the other Eastern European 
                                                     
7 In this connection, US analysts express traditional concerns about national minori-
ties in Latvia and Estonia considering them a threat to domestic political stability in 
these states and, therefore, NATO. However, the Baltics do not have any prerequi-
sites for large-scale civil conflicts — and they did not take place in the 1980—1990s. 
National minorities in Latvia and Estonia, despite being deprived of certain political 
and economic rights — are integrated into the labour market and social institutions 
of the Baltic societies. There are no radical organisations to assume leadership in 
preparing corresponding actions. 
8 The theme of national minorities in the Baltics are often addressed by western re-
searchers, who produce forecasts of different situations leading to political destabili-
sation in the region (see, for instance, [29]). 
9 This means a blockade of passenger, cargo and energy transit via the Kaliningrad 
region and Lithuania. Remarkably, the scenario of Kaliningrad blockade by Lithua-
nia is considered in detail in the open access publications of the Center for European 
Policy Analysis, cooperating with the Pentagon [15, p. 13]. Moreover, one cannot 
ignore Baltic politicians floating ‘trial-balloons’. See, for instance, the statement of 
Lithuania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevičius prior to the 2013 Eastern 
Partnership summit in Vilnius. He said that a blockade of the Kaliningrad region 
could not be excluded. 
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states — to take advantage of the economic and political opportunities of 
mediation between Russia, China, India, the EAEU, and the EU. Transit will 
develop along the North-West and West-East transport corridors running 
through the Baltics. These events will increase polycentricity in the Baltic 
ruling elite, reduce the significance of the political leitmotif of the ‘threat 
from the East’, and strengthen the pragmatic political positions within the 
business community aimed at multilateral politics. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The proposed theoretical model of political elites of smaller states al-
lowed for constructing three scenarios based on one key variable — the op-
portunity for the Baltic elites to choose a ‘niche’ in international politics. 
This choice is determined by the general international situation in Europe 
and, primarily, the evolution of the role of NATO in European security. In 
fact, there is a limited range of alternatives for the future development of the 
Baltic elites and these variants can be described rather accurately. 
The theoretical model makes it possible to produce normative forecasts, 
where most major factors and circumstances affecting the future states of the 
studied of political forecasts goes beyond the scope of a strict scientific the-
ory and requires expert evaluations and educated guesses based on concrete 
knowledge, experience, and an applied political analysis. 
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